Abstract. We study zero-sum stochastic differential games with player dynamics governed by a nondegenerate controlled diffusion process. Under the assumption of uniform stability, we establish the existence of a solution to the Isaac's equation for the ergodic game and characterize the optimal stationary strategies. The data is not assumed to be bounded, nor do we assume geometric ergodicity. Thus our results extend previous work in the literature. We also study a relative value iteration scheme that takes the form of a parabolic Isaac's equation. Under the hypothesis of geometric ergodicity we show that the relative value iteration converges to the elliptic Isaac's equation as time goes to infinity. We use these results to establish convergence of the relative value iteration for risk-sensitive control problems under an asymptotic flatness assumption.
Introduction
In this paper we consider a relative value iteration for zero-sum stochastic differential games. This relative value iteration is introduced in [1] for stochastic control, and we follow the method introduced in this paper.
In Section 2, we prove the existence of a solution to the Isaac's equation corresponding to the ergodic zero-sum stochastic differential game. We do not assume that the data or the running payoff function is bounded, nor do we assume geometric ergodicity, so our results extend the work in [5] . In Section 3, we introduce a relative value iteration scheme for the zero-sum stochastic differential game and prove its convergence under a hypothesis of geometric ergodicity. In Section 4, we apply the results from Section 3 and study a value iteration scheme for risk-sensitive control under an asymptotic flatness assumption.
Problem Description
We consider zero-sum stochastic differential games with state dynamics modeled by a controlled nondegenerate diffusion process X = {X(t) : 0 ≤ t < ∞}, and subject to a long-term average payoff criterion.
2.1. State dynamics. Let U i , i = 1, 2 , be compact metric spaces and V i = P(U i ) denote the space of all probability measures on U i with Prohorov topology. Let
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be measurable functions. Assumptions onb and σ will be specified later. Define b :
for x ∈ R d , v 1 ∈ V 1 and v 2 ∈ V 2 . We model the controlled diffusion process X via the Itô s.d.e.
dX(t) = b X(t), v 1 (t), v 2 (t) dt + σ X(t) dW (t) . (2.1)
All processes on (2.1) are defined in a common probability space (Ω, F, P ) which is assumed to be complete. The process W = {W (t) : 0 ≤ t < ∞} is an R d -valued standard Wiener process which is independent of the initial condition X 0 of (2.1). Player i, with i = 1, 2 , controls the dynamics X through her strategy v i (·), a V i -valued process which is jointly measurable in (t, ω) ∈ [0, ∞) × Ω and non-anticipative, i.e., for s < t, W (t) − W (s) is independent of F s := the completion of σ(X 0 , v 1 (r), v 2 (r), W (r), r ≤ s) .
We denote the set of all such controls (admissible controls) for player i by U i , i = 1, 2 .
Assumptions on the Data: We assume the following conditions on the coefficientsb and σ to ensure existence of a unique solution to (2.1).
(A1) The functionsb and σ are locally Lipschitz continuous in x ∈ R d , uniformly over (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 , and have at most a linear growth rate in x ∈ R d , i.e., for some constant κ,
where σ 2 := trace σσ T , with T denoting the transpose. Alsob is continuous.
(A2) For each R > 0 there exists a constant κ(R) > 0 such that
where a := σσ T .
We denote the set of all stationary Markov strategies of player i by M i , i = 1, 2 .
2.2. Zero-sum ergodic game. Leth :
which is also locally Lipschitz continuous in its first argument. We define the relaxed running payoff function h :
Player 1 seeks to maximize the average payoff given by lim inf
over all admissible controls v 1 ∈ U 1 , while Player 2 seeks to minimize (2.2) over all v 2 ∈ U 2 . Here E x is the expectation operator corresponding to the probability measure on the canonical space of the process starting at
Since we shall analyze the average payoff as a limiting case of the discounted payoff in the 'vanishing discount' limit, we shall also consider the infinite horizon discounted payoff
where α > 0 is the discount factor. Assumptions on Ergodicity: We consider the following ergodicity assumptions:
(A3) There exist a positive inf-compact function V ∈ C 2 (R d ) and positive constants k 0 , k 1 and k 2 such thatL
for all (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 , and x ∈ R d . Without loss of generality we assume V ≥ 1.
(A3 ′ ) There exist nonnegative inf-compact functions V ∈ C 2 (R d ) and g ∈ C(R d ), and positive constants k 0 and k 2 such that
for all (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 , and x ∈ R d . Also,
Without loss of generality we assume V ≥ 1 and g ≥ 1. In this section we use assumption (A3 ′ ), while in Section 3 we employ (A3) which is stronger and equivalent to geometric ergodicity in the time-homogeneous Markov case.
For the uncontrolled (i.e., Markov) case, (A3 ′ ) is the so called 'g-norm ergodicity' in the terminology of [11] which implies, in addition to convergence of laws to a unique stationary distribution, convergence of 1 t t 0 E[f (X(s))] ds to the corresponding stationary expectation as t ↑ ∞ for all f with growth rate at most that of g and vice versa. Assumption (A3) corresponds to the same with h = V and implies in particular exponential convergence to stationary averages (and vice versa). This is the so called geometric ergodicity. When (A3 ′ ) holds in the controlled case, it implies in particular tightness of stationary distributions attainable under stationary Markov controls. In fact this condition is necessary and sufficient. See [2, Lemma 3.3.4] for this and other equivalent characterizations. Thus (A3 ′ ) is the best possible condition for uniform stability in this sense. While the results of [1] can be extended to control problems when instability is possible but is penalized by the cost structure, this does not extend naturally to the zero sum game, because what is penalty for one agent is a reward for the other.
We start with a theorem which characterizes the value of the game under a discounted infinite horizon criterion. For this we need the following notation: For a continuous function
V(x) < ∞. This is a Banach space under the norm
.
and is characterized by
Let v R 1α : B R → V 1 be a measurable selector for the maximizer in (2.5) and v R 2α : B R → V 2 be a measurable selector for the minimizer in (2.4). If we let
α is continuous and also Lipschitz in x, and ϕ R α satisfies
By a routine application of Itô's formula, it follows that
where
and X is the solution to (2.1) corresponding to the control pair (v R 1α , v 2 ), with v 2 ∈ U 2 . Repeating the above argument with the outer minimizer v R 2α of (2.4), we similarly obtain
Combining (2.6) and (2.7), we obtain inf
Also ϕ R α is nondecreasing in R. By Assumption (A3 ′ ), it follows that
where X is a solution to (2.1) corresponding to some stationary Markov control pair. Since the function
Beneš' measurable selection theorem [4] asserts that there exist controls (v R 1α , v R 2α ) ∈ M 1 × M 2 which realize the minimax in (2.4)-(2.5), i.e., for all x ∈ B R the following holds:
where K 1 > 0 is a constant independent of R ′ and K 2 (R) is a constant depending only on the bound of h on B 2R . Using standard approximation arguments involving Sobolev imbedding theorems, see [2, p. 111], it follows that there exists
By standard regularity arguments, see [2, p. 109] , one can show that ψ α ∈ C 2,r (R d ), 0 < r < 1. Also using the minimax condition, it follows that ψ α ∈ C 2,r (R d ), 0 < r < 1, is a solution to
Let v α 1 ∈ M 1 and v α 2 ∈ M 2 be an outer maximizing and an outer minimizing selector for (2.3), respectively, corresponding to ψ α given above. Then ψ α satisfies the p.d.e.
For v 1 ∈ U 1 , let X be the solution to (2.1) corresponding to (v 1 , v α 2 ) and the initial condition x ∈ R d . Applying the Itô-Dynkin formula, we obtain
Since ψ α ≥ 0, we have
Using Fatou's lemma we obtain
Similarly, for v 2 ∈ U 2 , let X be the solution to (2.1) corresponding to (v α 1 , v 2 ) and the initial condition x ∈ R d . By applying the Itô-Dynkin formula, we obtain
Hence, we have
By (2.9) and (2.11), we obtain
Also by (2.8) and (2.10) we have
This implies the desired characterization.
Remark 2.1. Using Theorem 2.1, one can easily show that any pair of measurable outer maximizing and outer minimizing selectors of (2.3) is a saddle point equilibrium for the stochastic differential game with state dynamics given by (2.1) and with a discounted criterion under the running payoff function h.
such that β is the value of the game.
where X is a solution to (2.1) corresponding to ( 
is the unique invariant probability measure of the process (2.1) corresponding 
Combining (2.14)-(2.17), we have
where K 4 > 0 is a constant independent of α > 0.
In view of (2.18), one can use the arguments in [2, Lemma 3.5.4, pp. 108-109] to show that along some sequence α n ↓ 0, α n ψ α (0) converges to a constant ̺ andψ αn converges uniformly on compact sets to a function ϕ * ∈ C 2 (R d ), where the pair (̺, ϕ * ) is a solution to the p.d.e.
Moreover, using the Isaac's condition, it follows that (̺, ϕ * ) ∈ R × C 2 (R d ) satisfies (2.13). We claim that ϕ * ∈ o(V), i.e., 
(2.20)
Let X be the solution to (2.1) under the control (v α 1 , v 2 ), with v 2 ∈ U 2 , and initial condition x ∈ R d . Then by applying the Itô-Dynkin formula to e −αt ψ α (X(t)) and using (2.20), we obtain
which we write as 
Hence from (2.21) and (2.22), we obtain
Therefore,
for some nonnegative constant M (r) such that M (r) → 0 as r ↓ 0. Next from the definition of ϕ * , by letting α ↓ 0 along the sequence given in the proof of Theorem 2.2, we obtain 
Let v 1 ∈ U 1 and X be the process in (2.1) under the control (v 1 , v * 2 ) and initial condition x ∈ R d . By applying the Itô-Dynkin formula, we obtain
for all t ≥ 0. Using Fatou's lemma and [2, Lemma 3.7.2, p. 125], we obtain
Dividing by t and taking limits again using [2, Lemma 3.7.2, p. 125], we obtain
Since v 1 ∈ U 1 was arbitrary, we have
The pair (̺, ϕ * ) also satisfies the p.d.e.
Let v 2 ∈ U 2 and X be the process in (2.1) corresponding to (v * 1 , v 2 ) and initial condition x ∈ R d . By applying the Itô-Dynkin formula, we obtain
Next, by letting R → ∞ and using the dominated convergence theorem for the l.h.s. and [2, Lemma 3.7.2, p. 125] for the r.h.s., we obtain
Also by [2, Lemma 3.7.2, p. 125], we obtain
Since v 2 ∈ U 2 was arbitrary, we have
Combining (2.24) and (2.25), we obtain
i.e. ̺ = β, the value of the game. This completes the proof. 
and is unique in the class of functions that do not grow faster than V and vanish at x = 0.
Relative Value Iteration
We consider the following relative value iteration equation. ∂ϕ ∂t (t, x) = min
. This can be viewed as a continuous time continuous state space variant of the relative value iteration algorithm for Markov decision processes [12] . Convergence of this relative value iteration scheme is obtained through the study of the value iteration equation which takes the form ∂ϕ ∂t (t, x) = min
where β is the value of the average payoff game in Theorem 2.2. Under Assumption (A3), it is straightforward to show that for each T > 0 there exists a unique solution ϕ in
First, we prove the following important estimate which is crucial for the proof of convergence. 
Proof. The proof follows by mimicking the arguments in [1, Lemma 4.1], using the following estimate
where X is the solution to (2.1) corresponding to any admissible controls v 1 and v 2 and initial condition x ∈ R d . The estimate for ϕ follows from the arguments in [2, Lemma 2.5.5, pp. 63-64], noting that for all v i ∈ U i , i = 1, 2 , we have
is the truncation of h at n ≥ 0.
Next, we turn our attention to the p.d.e. in (3.2) . It is straightforward to show that the solution ϕ to (3.2) also satisfies ∂ϕ ∂t (t, x) = max
Definition 3.1. We letv i : R + × R d → V i for i = 1, 2 be an outer maximizing and an outer minimizing selector of (3.4) and (3.2), respectively. For each t ≥ 0 we define the (nonstationary) Markov control
denote the probability measure and E
the expectation operator on the canonical space of the process under the control v i ∈ U i , i = 1, 2 , conditioned on the process X starting from x ∈ R d at t = 0.
It is straightforward to show that the solution ϕ of (3.2) satisfies,
2) satisfies the following estimate
and for all t ≥ s ≥ 0, where ϕ * is as in Theorem 2.2.
Proof. Let v * 1 ∈ M 1 and v * 2 ∈ M 2 be an outer maximizing and outer minimizing selector of (2.13), respectively. By (3.5) we obtain
for all t ≥ s ≥ 0. By (3.6)-(3.7) we obtain
and an application of (3.3) completes the proof.
Arguing as in the proof of [1, Lemma 4.4], we can show the following:
, and
for all x ∈ R d and t ≥ 0.
Convergence of the relative value iteration is asserted in the following theorem.
converges to ϕ * (x) + constant and ϕ(t, x) converges to ϕ * (x) + β as t → ∞.
Proof. By Lemma 3.2 the map x → ϕ(t, x) is locally bounded, uniformly in t ≥ 0. It then follows that
, t ≥ 1 are locally Hölder equicontinuous (see [10, Theorem 5.1] ). Therefore the ω-limit set ω(ϕ 0 ) of any initial condition
To simplify the notation we define
Let {t n n ∈ N} ⊂ R + be any increasing sequence such that t n ↑ ∞ and
Dropping to a subsequence we assume that t n+1 − t n ↑ ∞ as n → ∞. By construction f + ϕ * ∈ ω(ϕ 0 ).
We first show that f is a constant. We definē
and a subsequence {k n } ⊂ N by
Since Φ tn converges to f uniformly on compact sets as n → ∞, it follows that k n ↑ ∞ as n → ∞. Let D be any fixed closed ball centered at the origin such that
It is straightforward to verify using (3.3) that if X is the solution to (2.1) corresponding to any admissible controls v 1 and v 2 and initial condition x ∈ R d then there exists T 0 < ∞ depending only on x, such that
By the standard estimates of hitting probabilities for diffusions (see [9, Lemma 1.1]) for any r > 0 there exists a constant γ > 0 depending only on r and D, such that with B r (y) denoting the open ball of radius r centered at y ∈ R d we have 
Combining (3.9) and (3.11) and using the Markov property, we obtain 12) and for all x ∈ R d . Note that if n is sufficiently large, then D ⊂ B kn and therefore the function x →f + 1 kn − Φ tn (x) is nonnegative on D. Thus the local Hölder equicontinuity of {Φ t , t > 0} (this collection of functions locally share a common Hölder exponent) allows us to apply (3.12) for any fixed x ∈ R d to obtain
for all n large enough. For A ⊂ R d and x ∈ R d we define
By (3.6), (3.8) and (3.13) we have
We claim that Ψ n (x; B c kn ) → 0 as n → ∞. Indeed if X is the solution to (2.1) corresponding to any admissible controls v 1 and v 2 and initial condition x ∈ R d then by (3.3) we have
By Lemma 3.2 we have
It follows by (3.15)-(3.16) that
uniformly in s ≥ 0, which proves that Ψ n (x; B c kn ) → 0 as n → ∞. Thus, taking limits as n → ∞ in (3.14), we obtain
Taking the supremum over x ∈ R d of the left hand side of (3.17) it follows that Γ f − min y∈D f (y) = 0 which implies that f is constant on D. Since D was arbitrary if follows that f must be a constant.
We next show that f is unique. We argue by contradiction. Suppose that Φ t ′ n → f ′ over some increasing sequence {t ′ n } with t ′ n ↑ ∞ as n → ∞. Without loss of generality we assume t n < t ′ n < t n+1 for each n. By (3.6) we have
and taking limits as n → ∞ in (3.18) we obtain f ≤ f ′ . Reversing the roles of f and f ′ , shows that f = f ′ . By Lemma 3.3 we have
Hence, since ϕ(t, x) converges to ϕ * (x)+f , we obtain that ϕ(t, x) → ϕ * (x)+β as t → ∞.
Risk-Sensitive Control
In this section, we apply the results from Section 3 to study the convergence of a relative value iteration scheme for the risk-sensitive control problem which is described as follows. Let U be a compact metric space and V = P(U ) denote the space of all probability measures on U with Prohorov topology. We consider the risk-sensitive control problem with state equation given by the controlled s.d.e. (in relaxed form)
and payoff criterion
This is called the risk-sensitive payoff because in some sense it is sensitive to higher moments of the running cost and not merely its mean, thus capturing 'risk' in the sense understood in economics [13] . All processes in (4.1) are defined in a common probability space (Ω, F, P ) which is assumed to be complete. The process W is an R d -valued standard Wiener process which is independent of the initial condition X 0 of (2.1). The control v is a V -valued process which is jointly measurable in (t, ω) ∈ [0, ∞) × Ω and non-anticipative, i.e., for s < t, W (t) − W (s) is independent of F s := the completion of σ(X 0 , v(r), W (r), r ≤ s) . We denote the set of all such controls (admissible controls) by U .
Assumptions on the Data: We assume the following properties for the coefficients b and σ:
(B1) The functions b and σ are continuous and bounded, and also Lipschitz continuous in x ∈ R d uniformly over v ∈ V . Also (σσ T ) −1 is Lipschitz continuous.
(B2) For each R > 0 there exists a constant κ(R) > 0 such that
Asymptotic Flatness Hypothesis:
We assume the following property:
(B3) (i) There exists a c > 0 and a positive definite matrix Q such that for all x, y ∈ R d with x = y, we have
(ii) Let Lip(f ) denote the Lipschitz constant of a Lipschitz continuous function f . Then
The asymptotic flatness hypothesis was first introduced by [3] for the study of ergodicity in degenerate diffusions and is a little more general than the condition introduced by [7] in risk-sensitive control to facilitate the analysis of the corresponding HJB equation, which is our motivation as well. An important consequence of this condition is that if we fix a nonanticipative control process and consider two diffusion processes with this control differing only in their initial conditions, they approach each other in mean at an exponential rate [2, Lemma 7. 
has a unique solution (β, ϕ * ) ∈ R × C 2 (R d ) ∩ o( x ). Moreover, β is the value of the risk-sensitive control problem and any measurable outer minimizing selector in (4.2) is risksensitive optimal. Also in (4.2), the supremum can be restricted to a closed ballṼ = B R for
where K is the smallest positive root (using (B3) (ii)) of √ c 2 σσ That one has ln ψ(t, 0) instead of ψ(t, 0) as the 'offset' is only natural, because we are trying to approximate the logarithmic growth rate of the cost. We have the following theorem: Under assumptions (B1)-(B3) the solution ψ(t, x) of the relative value iteration in (4.3) converges as t → ∞ to e β ψ * (x) where β is the value of the risk-sensitive control problem given in Theorem 4.1.
Proof. A straightforward calculation shows that ψ * = e ϕ * , where ϕ * is given in Theorem 4.1. Then it easily follows that ψ(t, x) = e ϕ(t,x) , where ϕ is the solution of the relative value iteration for the stochastic differential game in (4.2). From Theorem 4.2, it follows that ψ(t, x) → e β ψ * (x) as t → ∞, which establishes the claim.
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